The Aftermath of World War One
The First World War ended on the 11th of November 1918, concluding a four-year period in which Eastern France had been almost continuously occupied by enemy forces. The conflict had killed over one million French citizens, while a further 4 - 5 million had been wounded; great scars ran across both the landscape, and the European psyche. In the aftermath of this war France began to ask a vital question: how should it now defend itself?
This dilemma grew in importance after the Treaty of Versailles, the famous document of 1919 that was supposed to prevent further conflict by crippling and punishing the defeated countries, but whose nature and severity is now recognised as having partly caused the Second World War. Many French politicians and generals were unhappy with the terms of the treaty, believing that Germany had escaped too lightly. Some individuals, such as Field Marshall Foch, argued that Versailles was simply another armistice, and that war would ultimately resume.
The Question of National Defence
Accordingly, the question of defence became an official matter in 1919 when the French Prime Minster, Clemenceau, discussed it with Marshal Pétain, the head of the armed forces. Various studies and commissions explored many options, and three main schools of thought emerged. Two of these based their arguments on evidence gathered from the First World War, advocating a line of fortifications along France's eastern border. A third looked toward the future. This final group, who included a certain Charles de Gaulle, believed that war would become fast and mobile, organised around tanks and other vehicles with air support. These ideas were frowned upon within France, where the consensus of opinion regarded them as being inherently aggressive and requiring outright attacks: the two defensive schools were preferred.
The 'Lesson' of Verdun
The great fortifications at Verdun were judged to have been the most successful in the Great War, surviving artillery fire and suffering little internal damage. The fact that Verdun's largest fortress, Douaumont, had fallen easily to a German attack in 1916 only broadened the argument: the fort had been built for a garrison of 500 troops, but the Germans found it manned by less than a fifth of that number. Large, well-built and - as attested to by Douaumont - well-maintained defences would work. Indeed, the First World War had been a conflict of attrition in which many hundreds of miles of trenches, mainly dug from mud, reinforced by wood, and surrounded by barbed wire, had held each army at bay for several years. It was simple logic to take these ramshackle earthworks, mentally replace them with massive Douaumont-esque forts, and conclude that a planned defensive line would be wholly effective.
The Two Schools of Defence
The first school, whose main exponent was Marshall Joffre, wanted large quantities of troops based in a line of small, heavily defended, areas, from which counter attacks could be launched against anyone advancing through the gaps. The second school, led by Pétain, advocated a long, deep and constant network of fortifications which would militarize a large area of the eastern border and hark back to the Hindenburg line. Unlike most high-ranking commanders in the Great War, Pétain was considered as both a success and a hero; he was also synonymous with defensive tactics, lending great weight to the arguments for a fortified line. In 1922 the recently promoted Minister for War began to develop a compromise, based largely on the Pétain model; this new voice was André Maginot.
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For Citation And Footnotes
Title: The Maginot Line
Author: Robert Wilde
Date: 2001
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