| The Maginot Line | |||||||
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Part 3: Creation and Purpose 1 (1922 - 1930) |
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Fortification was a matter of grave urgency for a man called André Maginot: he believed the French government to be weak, and the 'safety' provided by the Treaty of Versailles to be a delusion. Although Paul Painlevé replaced him at the Ministry for War in 1924, Maginot was never completely separated from the project, often working with the new Minister. Progress was made in 1926, when Maginot and Painlevé obtained Government funding for a new body, the Committee of Frontier Defence (Commission de Défense des Frontieres or CDF), to build three small experimental sections of a new defence plan, based largely on the Pétain espoused Line model. After returning to the war ministry in 1929, Maginot built upon the CDF's success, securing government funding for a full-scale defensive line. There was plenty of opposition, including the Socialist and Communist parties, but Maginot worked hard to convince them all. Although he may not have visited every government ministry and office in person - as the legend states - he certainly used some compelling arguments. He cited the falling numbers of French manpower, which would reach a low-point in the 1930's, and the need to avoid any other mass bloodshed, which might delay -or even stop - the population recovery. Equally, while the Treaty of Versailles had allowed French troops to occupy the German Rhineland, they were obliged to leave by 1930; this buffer zone would need some sort of replacement. He countered the pacifists by defining the fortifications as a non-aggressive method of defence (as opposed to fast tanks or counter attacks), and pushed the classic political justifications of creating jobs and stimulating industry. How the Maginot Line Was Supposed to Work Funding and Organisation Next page > Creation and Purpose 2 > Page 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 For Citation And Footnotes |
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